High Court Judge raises concerns over litigants in person, AI-generated arguments and “substantial and increasing” workload of public law cases

In dismissing the claim (BEA, R (on the application of) v Staffordshire County Council [2026] EWHC 1190 (Admin)) brought over the local authority’s placement of the claimant’s son with his paternal aunt, Kimblin J made a number of additional comments about AI-generated arguments, Litigants in Person and the rise in JR volumes.

On AI-generated submissions, Kimblin J noted his concern that the claimant's written materials may have been AI-generated, after noticing the unusual word "academicity" appeared formatted in the same way in two separate litigants-in-person cases before him in the same week.

He said: “The basis of the claimant’s written submissions is not known and I am sceptical about it. The court has to have confidence in the research and comprehension of the legal authorities which underpin a submission. My concern that AI has contributed to the written argument without reference to the key authorities may be ill-founded.”

Meanwhile, Kimblin J was critical of a non-lawyer who appeared to be “the driving force behind the claim”. ‘Mr R’ had previously been refused McKenzie Friend status and warned by multiple judges.

Kimblin J said at the end of the judgment: “I have no means of restraining Mr R. If I had, I would give serious consideration to doing so.”

The claimant brought a judicial review challenging Staffordshire County Council's placement of her son (Child X) with his paternal aunt between August 2025 and February 2026.

Child X was subject to an interim care order under the Children Act 1989. The core question was whether the council acted unlawfully by continuing the placement beyond the 16-week time limit set by the Care Planning, Placement and Case Review (England) Regulations 2010.

Regulation 25(6) of the 2010 Regulations provides as follows: “If the period of temporary approval and of any extension to that period expires and the connected person has not been approved as a local authority foster parent in accordance with the Fostering Services Regulations, the responsible authority must terminate the placement after first making other arrangements for C’s accommodation.”

On 12 February 2026, HHJ Wall granted permission on limited grounds, observing:

“Ground 1(2) is a specific challenge to the lawfulness/legality of the placement continuing after expiry of the extension period provided by regulation 25 of the Regulations. […] The Defendant does not dispute that the placement is unregulated. The summary grounds of resistance do not suggest any statutory basis for the continuation of the placement after expiry of the extension period but rather suggest mitigations and considerations that address the welfare of Child X. In light of the mandatory wording of regulation 25(2) and (6) of the Regulations I am satisfied that Ground 1(2) is arguable.

“If the lawfulness/legality of the continuation of the placement is arguable, it follows that Ground 5 is similarly arguable because the qualified nature of Article 8 is such that interference with Article 8 rights by a public authority must be lawful.”

On 25 February 2026, the placement with the paternal aunt ended. This was because she felt unable to continue caring for Child X after armed police attended her home - an incident the council attributed to the claimant. Child X was then placed with a professional foster carer.

The judge rejected the claim after finding that the disputed placement had already ended. “The answer to the legal questions posed by the case would be answers to theoretical questions. Nevertheless, I am not prepared to decide a theoretical case on a matter of statutory interpretation in the circumstances which I have indicated.”

Analysing the case, Kimblin J found it would be “inappropriate” to decide the grounds for which permission was granted. He said: “First, if the claimant succeeded in her arguments, there is no relief which the court could grant which would affect the situation about which she was concerned. That situation came to an end in February of this year. The answer to the legal questions posed by the case would be answers to theoretical questions.

“Second, the authorities are clear and long-standing that the discretion to determine such theoretical questions is to be exercised with caution. […] The authorities point away from undertaking the theoretical exercise without good reason in the wider public interest.

“Third, I have no evidence that there is a particular need to provide an interpretation of the disputed regulation. There is no list of cases which wait for an answer to a legal issue.

“Fourth, this case is a poor vehicle to determine the question at issue. It was evident to me during the hearing that the claimant struggled with the process in which she is engaged. She did not have the papers before her and she limited her oral input to a short statement. For a matter of interpretation to be decided which may have wider application, the court is assisted by adversarial argument.”

After the claim was dismissed, costs were awarded against the claimant on the basis that “the claimant was warned about the theoretical nature of the claim. […] That warning was not headed. It was ignored”.

Finally, a limited civil restraint order was made against the claimant, despite HHJ Kelly having previously held back from doing so.

Kimblin J said: “The case has now moved on and it is evident to me that the claimant, driven by Mr R, is persistent in respect of this case. This case should not have been pursued. An application to withdraw the claim should have been made earlier this year. That would have been a reasonable application to make and on the basis of no order as to costs.

“This court receives a substantial and increasing workload of public law cases. The receipts increased by 35% last year, and by similar amounts the year before. If litigants behave in the way which has occurred in this case, the demands on staff and the pressure on judicial resources has a serious adverse effect on access to the court by other parties. That is contrary to the public interest and the overriding objective. It is necessary to restrain that behaviour.

“I have no reason to believe that restraint of the claimant beyond this case is needed. I have made an order accordingly.”

Lottie Winson