Challenge to council failure to treat teenage boy as looked after child and provide adequate accommodation succeeds

In CLT, R (On the Application Of) v London Borough of Hounslow [2026] EWHC 162 (Admin) (30 January 2026), Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, allowed the judicial review on two grounds.

The claimant, (CLT), was aged 17 at the time of the hearing and was represented by his litigation friend and sister, CLA. Their mother and father died in 2018 and 2020, respectively.

Following his father’s admission to hospital and subsequent death, CLT remained living in council accommodation with his sister and a distant cousin, IF, under a private fostering arrangement (PFA).

Between February and June 2022, a social worker raised urgent concerns regarding mould, damp, and the tenancy status.

In July 2022, assessments recorded that IF was frequently absent for extended periods, the children were "living alone", hungry, and relying on neighbours for food.

The judge noted: “The home was in a ‘deplorable’ condition with no hot water. Despite noting ‘high’ risks, the arrangement was deemed suitable.”

IF was reported missing in February 2023 and remained largely uncontactable. By April 2023, rent arrears stood at £8,000.

IF was given a "grace period" by the council until mid-July 2023 to make a part payment towards the rent arrears because there were "other concerning matters" regarding IF's ability to provide appropriate care to the children going forward.

In September 2023, the council stated the children were supported under s.17 of the CA 1989. However, a report that month confirmed IF was neglectful, absent at night, and there was a lack of food.

In October 2023, the council issued an emergency food voucher to IF. Later that month, it was recorded that rent arrears were "paused".

In April and May 2025, the council recorded concerns regarding financial exploitation by IF. On 6 May 2025, a Service Request form recorded the claimant as a Child in Need requiring financial support.

The judicial review claim was issued by CLT in August 2025 on the following grounds:

• Ground 1: The council owes him the mandatory duty, under s.20 of the CA 1989, to provide him with accommodation as a child in need with no person holding parental responsibility for him and/or his father being prevented from providing him with suitable accommodation or care.
• Ground 2: He acquired "looked after" and "eligible" child status, engaging duties under ss.22 to 22G of the CA 1989, which the council breached by failing to maintain suitable care, ignoring reports of neglect and property disrepair, and failing to plan for his transition to adulthood.
• Ground 3: Alternatively, the council failed to discharge its duties to him as a child in need under s.17 of the CA 1989 by providing inadequate financial support.
• Ground 4: The council acted unlawfully by failing to conduct enquiries under s.47 of the CA 1989 despite, from 2022, having reasonable cause to suspect he was suffering, or was likely to suffer, significant harm due to IF's extended absences, the children living alone, lack of food, and poor housing conditions.

Outlining the claimant’s submissions on ground 1, the judge said: “The claimant alleges that he appeared to require accommodation following his father's death in November 2020, at which point no person held parental responsibility for him. He argues that the defendant's records confirm it formed this view at the material time and that the defendant cannot rely on a purported ‘private fostering arrangement’ (PFA) with IF to evade its statutory obligations.

“The claimant submits that because the defendant owned the address, had the right to evict him but chose not to, the defendant itself provided the accommodation, and that a PFA cannot exist in such circumstances nor be used to side-step s.20 duties once they arise.”

Discussing ground 1, the judge said: “The central issue under Ground 1 is whether, at any material time from November 2020, the claimant appeared to the defendant to require accommodation as a result of there being no person who had parental responsibility for him, or the person who had been caring for him being prevented from providing him with suitable accommodation or care (s. 20(1)(a) and (c) CA 1989).”

He said it was “common ground” that the claimant was a "child", "a child in need", and "within the local authority's area".”

The judge continued: “The Defendant relies on Cunningham to argue that the existence of a willing family member to care for a child negates the need for accommodation. However, Cunningham is materially distinguishable. In that case, the grandmother intervened immediately and autonomously to care for the child in her own home. In the present case, the defendant assumed primary responsibility in making the initial arrangements regarding the children following their father's death; the defendant provided the address without which the arrangement with IF could not have functioned, as IF moved into the defendant's property to care for the claimant; and the arrangement with IF was orchestrated by the defendant allowing a non-tenant to reside in council property to care for a child who was also a non-tenant. These factors demonstrate a degree of state intervention and provision that far exceed the private family arrangement in Cunningham.

“Standing back and viewing the facts as a whole, the claimant was a child with no parents and no legal right to his home. The defendant arranged his care, vetted his carers, and provided the accommodation by permitting him to remain in council property. To characterise this as a private arrangement in which the child did not ‘require’ state accommodation was an error of law and a conclusion that was not reasonably open to the defendant.

“Accordingly, I find that the defendant should have found in law that the claimant appeared to the Defendant to require accommodation under s. 20(1) of the CA 1989. The duty arose on or around 11 November 2020. The defendant has failed to discharge that duty lawfully. Ground 1 succeeds.”

In relation to ground 2, the council had characterised this as “not amounting to a ground for judicial review”.

Considering this, the judge said: “In the course of discussion, both Counsel agreed with me that the issues raised through Ground 2 were coterminous with Ground 1 and that if the claimant were to succeed on Ground 1 it would follow that the claimant was a looked after child within the meaning of s.22(1) of the CA 1989 from November 2020. It would then follow inexorably that the defendant owed him the specific statutory duties consequent upon that status.

“Furthermore, the claimant is now aged 17. Having been looked after for a period exceeding 13 weeks since the age of 14, he meets the definition of an "eligible child" under § 19B(2) of Sched.2 to the CA 1989. This status triggers the specific duties referred to above to prepare him for adulthood. I formally allow the Claim under Ground 2 as well as Ground 1.”

The judge’s decision on Grounds 1 and 2 meant that any conclusion in respect of Ground 3 would be academic.

Finally, turning to ground 4, the judge said: “The threshold for ‘significant harm’ under s.47 CA 1989 is a high one, and the determination of whether it is met falls squarely within the professional judgement of social workers. The evidence demonstrates that the defendant was actively involved with the family throughout the relevant period, conducting regular child and family assessments, devising a Child in Need (CIN) plan, ensuring social worker allocation and providing support. Through these interventions, the defendant made enquiries into the claimant's welfare and housing conditions. While the claimant disagrees with the outcome of those assessments, in my judgement the defendant was entitled to conclude that the risks identified, including the housing disrepair and IF's inconsistent care of the claimant, did not trigger the need for s.47 enquiries.

“The court will not lightly interfere with the operational risk assessments of frontline social services. The decision that the threshold for significant harm was not met, and that the claimant's needs could be addressed through a Child in Need plan, was not irrational. Ground 4 is dismissed.”

The judicial review was allowed on two out of the four grounds.

Turning to the issue of relief, Benjamin Douglas-Jones KC said: “The claimant seeks a mandatory injunction; an order directing the defendant to accommodate the claimant at the address; and damages under Article 8 of the ECHR. In my judgment a mandatory order is neither necessary nor appropriate. Further, an order specifying where the claimant should be accommodated is not appropriate, as such relief might unduly fetter the exercise of the defendant's statutory duties. The claimant's further claim for damages was not pursued at the hearing before me and I make no such order.

“I will quash the defendant's failure to find that the claimant appeared to require accommodation within the meaning of s.20(1) CA 1989 and grant the claimant declarations that the defendant failed to comply with its duties under ss.20, 22, 22G of and §§ 19B and 19C of Sched.2 to the CA 1989. I will invite the defendant to reconsider the case in light of the judgment.”

Lottie Winson