High Court rejects local authority plan to remove three-year-old from long term foster carers to place for adoption alongside half-sister
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The High Court has granted an adoption order in favour of long-term foster carers, rejecting a local authority’s plan to remove a three-year-old child (T) from the family she has known in order to place her for adoption alongside her half-sister.
In T (A Child) (Non-Agency Adoption), Re [2026] EWHC 391 (Fam), Mr Justice McKendrick concluded that T’s welfare throughout her life required adoption by her foster carers, Mr and Mrs X, and made a post-adoption contact order to preserve her relationship with her sister.
He said: “To remove T from the only carers and home she has ever had would be contrary to her welfare interests. The various social workers were correct to describe this as trauma. I therefore accept the welfare analysis of the Guardian, the Independent Social Worker and the second respondent’s social worker evidence that removal of T from the X family would be a trauma akin to bereavement with long and short-term consequences.”
The case came before the court by way of two linked applications: an application under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction for an injunction to prevent T’s removal from the Applicants (Mr and Mrs X), and a non-agency adoption application brought by the Applicants.
The first respondent was T’s mother. The second respondent, the London Borough of Ealing, obtained care and placement orders in respect of T in August 2023.
The judge noted: “They [Ealing] opposed the application for an injunction and they oppose the Applicants adopting T. They seek to place T with her birth half-sister, R, who is placed with adoptive parents in the north of England.”
He added: “The third respondent, the London Borough of Hounslow, is the local authority where the applicants reside and as such were made a respondent to the adoption proceedings by operation of the Family Procedure Rules. They are neutral on the applications.”
T was born in November 2022. She was removed from her mother’s care shortly after birth due to concerns about alcohol and substance misuse and domestic abuse, and was discharged from hospital at five days old into the care of the applicants.
She has never lived with her mother or siblings and has never met her father, who is in prison and does not have parental responsibility.
In August 2023, care and placement orders were made in favour of the London Borough of Ealing.
Between August 2023 and March 2025, Ealing’s social work team was unable to identify a suitable adoptive placement for T and her half-sister, R.
In September 2024, a Together and Apart assessment undertaken by the local authority concluded that R and T be placed in separate adoptive placements, in the event adopters were not identified to take both R and T, noting evidence that R presented with “competing needs” and that no prospective adopters had been identified willing to adopt the sibling group.
In February 2025, the authority informed the Applicants that T would be removed from their care and placed with R for adoption.
Mr and Mrs X asked the local authority to reconsider and to obtain a professional assessment on the subject of the impact of disrupting T’s attachment to them. The local authority did not agree to do so.
In March 2025, Mr and Mrs X gave notice to Ealing of their intention to adopt T. Mr and Mrs X requested the local authority’s assurances that T would not be removed from their care pending the determination of their adoption application. The local authority did not agree and informed Mr and Mrs X that they were proceeding with the plan to place T with R.
In April 2025, the Applicants applied for an injunction to prevent T’s removal from their care. In May 2025, the applicants sent an application for an adoption order to the Central Family Court.
A hearing of the application for an injunction was listed in June 2025.
A Deputy High Court Judge made an interim injunction preventing the removal of T from the care of Mr and Mrs X (save for emergencies).
McKendrick J noted: “It appears the judge determined that the adoption application could proceed and “deemed” the adoption application to have been made at the date of the hearing….”
R moved to live with her adopters in July 2025.
By late 2025, both the sibling assessment and the Annex A/FPR r.14.11 report recommended that T should be adopted by the applicants. T’s Guardian supported that course. The local authority maintained its opposition.
When the matter came before McKendrick J in January 2026, procedural concerns emerged. The adoption application had been lodged but not formally issued. The birth mother had not been served with the injunction proceedings.
The judge directed that redacted copies of specified documents be served on the mother and that she be written to explaining the nature of the injunction and adoption applications and the final hearing date.
By early February 2026, both birth parents had been served with notice of the adoption application and the final hearing.
McKendrick J said: “At the outset of the hearing on 9 February 2026 I raised with the parties my considerable concerns about: (i) the nature of a “deemed” but not issued application; (ii) fair notice to, and service upon, on the first respondent; (iii) whether proper consideration could be given to joinder of the birth father and whether consideration of his joinder would need to be adjoined to ensure fairness and the satisfaction of all statutory and procedural requirements. All represented parties submitted all requirements in relation to these issues could be met or legitimately and properly waived.”
He concluded that the applicants had given more than three months’ notice of their intention to adopt to both relevant authorities.
In respect of the birth mother, the judge held that she had long been aware of the substance of the applications and had set out her views. He added: “In as much as it is necessary to abridge time for service on her of the adoption application, I do so. Such an abridgement is both just and necessary to permit the court to fairly proceed to consider the much delayed welfare issues that arise in respect of T.”
As to the father, the court concluded that it was not necessary to join him as a party to the proceedings.
The evidence before the court mostly amounted to different opinion evidence, as opposed to disputed facts, McKendrick J observed.
The applicants described T as having lived with them since she was five days old and as knowing no other family. They emphasised cultural links between their east African heritage and that of T’s father. They told the court they were committed to promoting regular, “organic” contact between T and R if T were adopted by them.
Counsel for the local authority stated that the applicants had originally been approved as short-term foster carers and had been aware that the plan was for T to be placed for adoption alongside R. The authority acknowledged there would be an “emotional impact” on T in leaving the applicants but described this as typical of a move from foster care to adoptive placement.
The social worker emphasised the importance of sibling relationships, describing them as “identity-shaping”.
His written evidence was that whilst the siblings had never lived together, they had established a “significant sibling relationship”. He summarised the statutory guidance as expecting siblings to be placed together unless “overriding reasons indicate otherwise”.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court granted the adoption order in favour of Mr and Mrs X and made a post-adoption contact order to preserve T’s relationship with R.
McKenrick J first recorded his “disquiet” over the long delay to resolution of the issue for T.
He said: “I agree there was a failure by the second respondent to carry out robust care planning for T. I am also concerned that whilst the injunction proceedings were issued in April 2025 they are only now being resolved in late February 2026. T is three. Eleven months is too long to decide the relatively straightforward matter of whether or not Mr and Mrs X should adopt T. The fig leaf of an interim injunction is no substitute for swift welfare decision making, particularly in the field of adoption. The welfare assessment for T may have looked different without the various delay before and after issue of proceedings.”
Outlining his reasoning for granting the adoption order in favour of Mr and Mrs X, he said: “The welfare imperative is for T to continue to live in the same home, with the same parents and her four older siblings. To remove T from the only carers and home she has ever had would be contrary to her welfare interests. The various social workers were correct to describe this as trauma. I therefore accept the welfare analysis of the Guardian, the ISW, SS and the second respondent’s social worker evidence that removal of T from the X family would be a trauma akin to bereavement with long and short-term consequences.”
He continued: “I therefore accept the agreed position that T’s welfare dictates she must be placed for adoption rather than be placed with birth family or long-term fostering. I accept the section 47, 2002 Act conditions are met for a non-agency adoption. I accept that section 52 (1) (b) of the 2002 Act applies and the T’s welfare dictates that her mother’s consent is dispensed with. I have applied section 1 (2) of the 2002 Act.
“T’s lifelong welfare dictates that she remains placed with Mr and Mrs X for the reasons I have given and therefore I reject the second respondent’s case to place T with R and the B family as this is contrary to her welfare needs both now and throughout her life. The strict test for ‘severing’ T’s links with her birth family are met because of the trauma of separation from Mr and Mrs X. Any interference in the Article 8 ECHR rights of the first respondent and/or R are justified in accordance with the law, as proportionate and necessary to safeguard the welfare interests of T.”
Turning to the issue of post adoption contact, McKendrick J said: “I have considered pursuant to section 46 of the 2002 Act the need for a post adoption contact order. I am satisfied I can make a post-adoption contact order pursuant to section 51A (1) of the 2002 Act because an adoption agency was authorised to place T for adoption and the court has made an adoption order.
“[…] I make a post adoption contact order requiring Mr and Mrs X to allow T to visit or stay with Mr and Mrs B (with their consent) for the purposes of having contact with R. There should be a minimum of six visits each year some in or near the vicinity of the B family home; and some in or in the vicinity of the X family home and/or some at a mutually agreed location if that is easier for the families. The visits should be mostly during R and T’s school holidays, given the distance that will separate them. It should be organic.”
Lottie Winson




