Intentional homelessness and tenancies obtained by false statement

In Emilia Munemo v Wolverhampton City Council [2026] EWCA Civ 329 the Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Council’s appeal holding that the Respondent, who had been evicted from her home because she had obtained it on the basis of her false statements, could as a consequence be considered to be intentionally homeless. In allowing the appeal, the case of Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2013] EWCA Civ 786; [2013] HLR 34 was distinguished.

In 2011, Birmingham CC granted Ms Munemo a secure tenancy of a flat (Flat 5) in its local authority area. In February 2020, whilst still a tenant of Flat 5, Ms Munemo applied to Wolverhampton CC (‘the Council’) for accommodation as homeless. She did not disclose the tenancy of Flat 5 and represented that she had never been a council tenant. Accepting that it owed Ms Munemo the full housing duty under s.193(2) Housing Act 1996, the Council allocated to her an introductory tenancy of a 3-bedroom house, 87 Thompson Avenue, which commenced on 9 March 2020 and which became a secure tenancy on its 12-month anniversary.

In April 2021, it was discovered by both Birmingham CC and Wolverhampton CC that Ms Munemo was holding two council tenancies. Wolverhampton CC served a notice seeking possession (s.83, Housing Act 1985) in respect of Thompson Avenue, relying on Ground 5, Sched.2, Housing Act 1985: the tenant is the person or one of the persons to whom the tenancy was granted and the landlord was induced to grant the tenancy by a false statement made knowingly or recklessly by (a) the tenant, or (b) a person acting at the tenant’s instigation.

Possession proceedings were issued. It was the Council’s case that, had Ms Munemo disclosed the tenancy of Flat 5, she would not have been granted the tenancy of Thompson Avenue. In her Defence Ms Munemo disputed the evidence in relation to her false representations and described Thompson Avenue as her home which she and her children had come to love and appreciate.

A possession order was made by DDJ Sharp on 12 October 2022, the Court finding that Ground 5 was proved and that it was reasonable to order possession. Ms Munemo’s application to have the order set aside was dismissed. Her later application to stay execution was also dismissed on 20 March 2023. The following day, she applied to Wolverhampton CC as homeless.

On 15 September 2023, the Council decided (s.184, 1996 Act) that Ms Munemo was intentionally homeless because the tenancy of Thompson Avenue had been granted on the basis of her false representations, which established Ground 5. Ms Munemo sought a statutory review pursuant to s.202. During the review process Ms Munemo and her solicitors challenged the factual matters in relation to the false statements and asserted that her conduct had not been deliberate or intentional.

The review process was protracted. It comprised two detailed minded-to-find letters (Reg. 7(2) The Homelessness (Review Procedure etc) Regulations 2018), and lengthy representations by Ms Munemo’s solicitors in response. At no time during the review process was it said that Thompson Avenue was not reasonable for Ms Munemo to continue to occupy or that the Council had made an error in this regard.

The Council issued its review decision on 11 July 2024. The Respondent brought a statutory appeal (s.204, 1996 Act), advancing 9 grounds of appeal. On 16 October 2024, the Respondent served a Skeleton Argument incorporating Amended Grounds of Appeal which largely abandoned the original 9 grounds and raised, instead, a new ground asserting that, because the Council had concluded that Ms Munemo had been granted a tenancy of Thompson Avenue as a result of her false and inaccurate information, it was “bound to conclude” that the property was “not reasonable for her continued occupation because it is unreasonable to continue to occupy accommodation against the wishes of the landlord where a tenancy has been determined to have been obtained by deception”.  The new line of challenge was raised shortly before the appeal hearing. In response, witness evidence was provided from the Council’s review officer.

The new ground was premised on the decision in Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2013] EWCA Civ 786 which concerned an applicant who, as a result of her immigration status, was not eligible for assistance under Part 7. In order to overcome this difficulty, Ms Chishimba used a fake passport to support her application for housing and was granted non-secure temporary accommodation. When the use of the fake passport was discovered, the Council served a notice to quit, bringing the tenancy to an end. Ms Chishimba was evicted. She applied again for accommodation as homeless. The Council decided that she was intentionally homeless because of her use of the false passport. On her appeal to the county court, and on the appeal to the Court of Appeal, it was held that the effective cause of homelessness was the applicant’s immigration status and because “she had not been entitled to the property in the first place”. A similar analysis was applied to whether it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy. It was held that in such circumstances it could not be said that it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy.

Ms Munemo’s appeal under s.204 was heard over two days, on 19 and 20 November 2025, by HHJ Grimshaw. In a reserved Judgement, the Judge concluded that the earlier decisions in Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2013] EWCA Civ 786; [2013] HLR 34, and R v Exeter City Council ex p Gliddon [1985] 1 All ER 493 (Admin Court) were indistinguishable and established a general principle that “where an applicant obtains a property by deception, and was not eligible to that accommodation from the start, it cannot be said that the applicant has accommodation that was reasonable for them to continue to occupy”. He also held that it was not Ms Munemo’s false statements that caused eviction, but the fact that she was ineligible for assistance under Part 7 (i.e. she had never been entitled to Thompson Avenue).

The Court of Appeal held that HHJ Grimshaw was wrong to hold that Chishimba and Gliddon could not be distinguished, and was also wrong to hold that ineligibility was causative Ms Munemo’s homelessness.

In giving a Judgment, with which the full Court agreed, Stuart-Smith LJ held that Chishimba was fundamentally different in two respects. First, in Chishimba, it was held that the real and effective cause of homelessness was the applicant’s immigration status (rather than her use of a false passport). By comparison, it was Ms Munemo’s false statement which was the relevant deliberate act because it was this that satisfied Ground 5 and led to DDJ Sharp being satisfied that it was reasonable to make a possession order.

Secondly, in Chishimba the applicant only ever acquired a non-secure tenancy which the landlord was able to terminate without a possession order. By comparison, whether or not the Respondent was entitled to housing when she applied to Wolverhampton CC in March 2020 was irrelevant. She obtained a secure tenancy, terminable only on statutory grounds. For the purpose of establishing Ground 5, the Council did not have to prove that Ms Munemo was not, or had never been, entitled to homelessness assistance. Lack of entitlement, or lack of eligibility for accommodation, was an irrelevant consideration because it could not have been causative of Ms Munemo’s homelessness.

Insofar as the Council’s review decision did not address the line of argument based on Chishimba (because it had not been raised during the review), it was held that the review officer’s witness statement dealt with the new point concisely but clearly. He could not be criticised for not addressing the pure legal arguments that were being advanced because that was the province of lawyers, not review officers.

Points of general significance arising from the Judgment are:

(i) there is no limitation of time on when the applicant’s causative deliberate act or omission must have taken place;

(ii) when considering intentional homelessness, often this is to be considered at the time when the applicant ceases to occupy the accommodation which is said to have been reasonable to continue to occupy. However, this does not mean that a ‘moment-specific’ blinkered approach which ignores anything and everything that does or does not occur or apply at the moment that the applicant ceases to occupy the property should be taken;

(iii) a review officer is not limited to the situation prevailing at one single point in time: rather, it is open to them to have regard to relevant information that is not specific to that moment;

(iv) In Denton v LB Southwark [2007] EWCA Civ 623; [2008] HLR 11, Arden LJ said that in considering whether the accommodation had been reasonable to continue to occupy, the applicant’s deliberate conduct which caused the loss of the accommodation should be ignored. This approach has been rephrased: when considering the question whether the accommodation is available and/or reasonable to continue to occupy, the applicant may not rely upon their deliberate act or omission to support a conclusion that the accommodation is not available and/or that it would not be reasonable for him to continue to occupy.

Jonathan Manning and Annette Cafferkey are barristers at 4-5 Gray’s Inn Square. They appeared for the Council.