A narrow distinction

A recent Supreme Court ruling on ‘intentional homelessness’ could have major consequences for local housing authorities, writes Alexander Campbell.

The decision in Haile v LB Waltham Forest [2015] UKSC 34 may make unwelcome reading for local authorities across the country. 

From now on, they will have to provide accommodation to more people under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. Authorities will still be able to refuse to accommodate people who are intentionally homeless but not if – prior to the authority’s decision – an intervening event means that the person would have ended up being homeless anyway.

How big a group of people will fall within this category remains to be seen. Nevertheless, local authorities with tightened purse strings and already scarce housing resources will be dismayed at the prospect of having to find even more space to house people.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, when local authority officers were making a decision about intentional homelessness, they simply had to ask themselves whether the applicant had been intentionally homeless at the point that they left their previous accommodation. In light of this new judgment, they will have to turn their minds to what has happened subsequent to the person leaving their earlier accommodation to see whether an intervening event has broken the chain of causation.

If there is “merely a possibility” that a later causative event would have intervened, then Din v Wandsworth LBC still reigns and the chain of causation is not broken. In other words, the person is still intentionally homeless.

On the other hand, if the intervening event is an “undeniable later event” (i.e. it actually did happen rather than it being a mere possibility), then Haile states that the chain of causation is broken and the person is not intentionally homeless.

Lord Neuberger described this possible/undeniable event distinction as being a “rather narrow ground” for distinguishing Din. The consequences may be tricky in practice. Let us take an example: a person is intentionally homeless but moves into temporary accommodation. They leave the temporary accommodation because they are in substantial rent arrears and are facing eviction. Was the threat of eviction a mere possibility (in which case we are in Din territory and the chain of causation stands firm)? Or was it an undeniable event (breaking the chain of causation as per Haile)? Local authority officers will have to decide. Does eviction become an undeniable event once a notice to quit has been served? Or when proceedings are issued? Or only once a possession order is made? If proceedings have been issued, will local authority officers have to make an assessment of the merits of the possession claim in order to decide if eviction is an undeniable event or merely a possibility?

What is striking about the decision in Haile is how narrow and technical a point the majority of the judges had to resort to in order to find for Ms Haile while not overturning Din. Ms Haile’s lawyers (Kerry Bretherton and Laura Tweedy) had argued principally for Din to be overturned. It appears that the court was not keen to alter too radically the long-established position laid down by Din. In reality though, Haile has fundamentally altered the way local authorities have to approach these cases and requires them to make their decision based on matters as they stand at the date of the decision, rather than the date the applicant became homeless. As an authority Din may not be dead and buried, but it is certainly not looking too healthy anymore.

However much some local authorities may lament some of the consequences of Haile, the reality is that if the Supreme Court had found for the local authority, the decision could have had some seemingly unjust results. A person who leaves suitable accommodation without a good reason will be intentionally homeless. If that accommodation burns down one day later, many would think it unjust of the local authority to ignore the fact that that person would have been homeless through no fault of their own if they had only stayed in their accommodation one more day - and it is debatable whether such an approach would be within the spirit of Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996.

Local authorities will have to revise their approach to intentional homelessness decisions with immediate effect. They will now always have to consider what has taken place since the person left their accommodation and whether an undeniable intervening event can be found. Deciding whether a subsequent event has truly broken the chain of causation may be tricky; the Supreme Court has opened up a whole new avenue for potential challenges to intentional homelessness decisions. Watch this space – it seems unlikely that we’ve heard the last word on this issue.

Alexander Campbell is a barrister at Hardwicke chambers. He can be contacted on 020 7242 2523 or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..