Section 21 - It’s not over yet

The government’s “roadmap” for the implementation of the Renters’ Rights Act 2025 confirms inter alia that private landlords will no longer be able to use section 21, Housing Act 1988 to evict their tenants from 1 May 2026 (a date is yet to be announced for the social rented sector). With the clock ticking, the pressure to serve a valid section 21 notice is greater than ever. 

The form of a section 21 notice is prescribed by Regulations: form 6A.  It requires the landlord to include a leave-by date in the following terms: “You are required to leave the below address after: (insert calendar date).  If you do not leave, your landlord may apply to the court for an order under section 21(1) or (4) of the Housing Act 1988 requiring you to give up possession: (insert address of the property).”

When considering what calendar date to insert, a section 21 notice has to give at least two months’ notice in writing: section 21(1)(b), Housing Act 1988; and it can be served during the fixed term: section 21(2), Housing Act 1988. So, can a landlord insert a date into a section 21 notice which: (a) complies with the relevant notice period; and (b) falls within the fixed term? Or would that invalidate the notice? Both the statutory framework and the government’s guidance notes to form 6A are silent on this issue. It was, however, recently considered on appeal in Paragon Asra Housing v Rainford, County Court at Leicester, 25 October 2025. Given the absence of any determinative authority on the point, this judgment (albeit a County Court one) may provide some assistance to practitioners.

Background

On 25 June 2020, Paragon Asra Housing granted Ms. Rainford an assured tenancy agreement with an initial probationary term of 12 months.  It was agreed that the probationary term constituted a fixed term AST subject to the provisions of section 21, Housing Act 1988. On its expiry, the AST would have converted into an assured tenancy.  Paragon extended the AST for a further 6 months expiring on 25 December 2021. Shortly afterwards, on 21 August 2021, it served a section 21 notice on Ms. Rainford requiring her to leave on 5 December 2021- 20 days before the fixed term expired.  

Ms. Rainford was unrepresented at the possession hearing on 15 May 2023 and a possession order was granted. She appealed on one ground: the judge had erred in law in allowing Paragon to rely on the section 21 notice. At the appeal hearing, three reasons were advanced in support of that contention: 

• The section 21 notice was untrue and misleading;
• As a matter of construction, the notice failed to comply with the statutory requirements under section 21, Housing Act 1988;
• The tenancy was subject to public law principles.

Judgment

His Honour Judge Hedley, Designated Civil Judge for Leicester and Northampton, found for the Appellant tenant and allowed the appeal.  

In determining the validity of the section 21 notice, he held that the starting point is to interpret the notice in accordance with Mannai v Eagle [1997] AC 749, that is to say, as it would be understood by a reasonable recipient reading it in context. It is then necessary to consider whether the notice complies with the relevant statutory requirements. To determine what those requirements are, he interpreted section 21, Housing Act 1988 using a purposive approach: Pease v Carter and another [2020] 1 WLR 1459.   

He held that the purpose of requiring the landlord to serve a section 21 notice was, at least, twofold: to give the tenant four months’ notice (due to Coronavirus provisions); and to reflect the landlord’s true entitlement to apply for possession. In applying those principles, he held that the section 21 notice was invalid for the following reasons:

• Paragon failed to ensure that the section 21 notice reflected its true entitlement;
• As it failed to do so, the notice was “objectionable” (Kennedy LJ in Lower Street Properties Ltd v Jones (1996) 28 HLR 877) and could not be relied upon to found a claim for possession;
• Further, as Hale LJ said in Fernandez v McDonald [2004] 1 WLR 1027 (para 23) although one purpose of the notice is to alert tenants to the need to look for alternative accommodation, another is to give the courts a clear and simple set of criteria which trigger their mandatory duty to give possession. The effect of Paragon’s argument is that it would be entitled to set-out a leave-by date when it was not entitled to ask for possession;
• There is no practical reason why Paragon could not have put in the section 21 notice a leave-after date of 25 December 2021;
• A failure to put such a date meant that the notice leave-after date created an immediate inconsistency between the date of the notice and the date on which Paragon was actually entitled to ask Ms Rainford to leave.

Comment

This decision confirms that landlords need to ensure that the date they require the tenant to leave in a section 21 notice takes into account both the relevant notice period and their contractual entitlement to possession. 

Toby Vanhegan and Ayesha Omar are barristers at 4-5 Gray’s Inn Square. They acted for the successful Appellant tenant instructed by GT Stewart Solicitors & Advocates.