High Court dismisses public sector equality duty claim against London borough

Deputy High Court judge Guy Vassall-Adams KC heard the case in which the claimant contended Bexley breached the duty (PSED) for her eight-year-old disabled son.

Bexley argued the claims were now academic as a result of accommodation offers, and because the claimant had an adequate alternative remedy through a statutory review and county court appeal. Bexley also denied it breached the PSED.

The claimant first approached Bexley in 2019 saying she had been placed there by the Home Office and made a homelessness application. Bexley accepted the main housing duty under s.193 of the Housing Act 1996.

Her son has autism spectrum disorder, global development delay, sensory processing disorder and speech and language difficulties with very challenging behaviour.

The first home she was offered was bought by Bexley in 2020 for temporary accommodation for homeless applicants and in 2025 the council made the claimant a final offer of permanent social housing elsewhere, which she initially accepted, leading to Bexley to consider its duty discharged.

But she then visited to sign the tenancy agreement and social landlord Orbit said it could not proceed as she had been rude and abusive towards its staff and refused to consent to relevant checks.

Bexley made a further offer of temporary accommodation pending the determination of the out-of-time appeal brought pursuant to s.204 of the Housing Act 1996 against Bexley’s review decision that the duty had been discharged.

In July this year, social workers told the council the claimant had removed the floor coverings and gripper rods leaving bare concrete flooring or exposed floorboards, claiming the partially exposed grippers might harm her children.

Deputy judge Vassall-Adams said there was a statutory right of appeal to the County Court “which Parliament has expressly provided to cater for challenges to decisions about the suitability of accommodation made by local authorities pursuant to their homelessness duties under the HA 1996”, with this right being unconditional, while judicial review is subject to a permission requirement.

“In this context I am completely satisfied that the claimant did have an adequate alternative remedy to bringing judicial review proceedings, as she could have sought a statutory review of the suitability of the premises under s.202 of the HA 1996 and then challenged that outcome by way of an appeal to the County Court under s.204,” he said.

He explained he accepted Bexley’s submission that the claim had become academic because offers of permanent and temporary accommodation made earlier related to places in which the claimant no longer lived.

The claimant argued that she wished to stay living in the most recently occupied temporary accommodation as she had developed local support networks, although Bexley wants the home vacated.

Deputy judge Vassall-Adams said: “However, as a matter of law it seems to me that [Bexley’s] case that this claim has become academic is unanswerable.

"Furthermore, [Bexley] is responsible for securing accommodation for many homeless families and has the difficult task of assessing the claimant's family's needs not in isolation but alongside its duties towards other families and its need to maintain its stock of temporary accommodation to deal with emergency situations, of which the premises is a part.

“There is an irreconcilable tension between the claimant's wish to stay where she is and the defendant's wish to move the claimant and her family on and free up the premises again as part of its stock of temporary accommodation, which it is legally entitled to do.”

He noted that Bexley had sought to discharge its functions in a way that safeguarded and promoted the welfare of the claimant’s son - including in the dispute about flooring - and respected the right to a private and family life, and said while dismissing the case that Bexley’s  decision-making had been “detailed, credible and rational”.

Mark Smulian