High Court dismisses renewed application for permission for judicial review over day care centre closures

In Howe v Buckinghamshire Council [2026] EWHC 706 (Admin) (25 March 2026), Eleanor Grey KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, accepted the submission that there was “no realistic prospect of establishing that the analysis made by [the defendant council], and information held, was insufficient and/or that the conclusions reached on the ability to meet needs were irrational”.

The claimant, referred to in the judgment as ‘C’, had been attending Burnham Day Centre, operated by Buckinghamshire, for over 13 years where he attended together with some 14 other service users.

He challenged a decision made by the council in its Cabinet on 9 September 2025, when it accepted recommendations:

1. To agree to operate a specialist support service for adults aged 18-64 with care and support needs from four sites: Aylesbury Opportunities Centre, Chesham Day Centre, Spring Valley Day Centre and Seeleys House (‘Seeleys’) – alongside continuing to commission specialist care and support to meet need.
2. To agree to discontinue providing adult social care day services at three sites: Buckingham Day Centre, Hillcrest Day Centre, Burnham Day Centre, noting that all adults supported from those sites would continue to receive suitable alternative care and support.

C also applied for interim relief.

Papers were received in the Administrative Court Office on 9 December 2025 and issued for service on 11 December 2025. The council therefore submitted that the application was not made "promptly".

The application for permission was refused by HHJ Dunne, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, on 15 February 2026. He gave detailed written reasons for his decision, both on the merits of the grounds and also for accepting the submission that the application had not been made 'promptly'.

At the renewal hearing, counsel for the claimant relied on all the grounds originally set out, but focussed on two main over-arching legal points, submitting that:

1. The council did not undertake any assessment of the needs of individual Burnham services users or any assessment of whether Burnham service users' individual needs could be met at Seeleys; and
2. The council did not consult on the plan to move Burnham service users to Seeleys.

He said that both matters gave rise to an “arguable error of law”. He also said the judge was wrong to find that the claim had not been brought 'promptly'.

Considering the first ground, Eleanor Grey KC said: “Mr Mant [for the claimant] says it was not rational to base the decision to close Burnham on the assumption that its service users' needs could be met at Seeleys in the absence of (a) any individual assessment of the service users needs' (whether directly or through enquiry with the ICB); or (b) any individualised analysis of whether Seeleys could meet the assessed needs of those service users. He accepts that such individualised assessments are not always needed in decisions to close services, but he says in this case there was an assumption – which had not been investigated in the consultation – that all Burnham residents could attend Seeleys. The decision cannot be rationally supported, and in particular there was insufficient inquiry to enable such a judgement to be made.”

She continued: “It is submitted that D [the council] relies on a post-facto analysis of C's needs and the provision available at the retained site (Seeleys). […] However, this analysis is not seen anywhere in the decision-making documents and cannot be relied upon now to cure the irrational lack of inquiry at the relevant time. The only assessment undertaken as part of the decision-making process was "high level desktop modelling" which did not involve any consideration of specific service users' needs or how they could be met. The Tameside duty of inquiry was not – arguably - satisfied.

“In this regard, C relies on the analogy of R (B) v Worcestershire CC [2009] EWHC 2915 (Admin) ("Worcestershire") in which Stadlen J struck down a closure decision when "reasonable steps were not taken to provide the decision maker with the relevant information to enable the decision maker to make a rational decision" (§95) and "the Council was not in a position at the time it took the decision to reach a rational conclusion that the staff availability and facilities under the new arrangement would be sufficient as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that they would meet the needs of the claimants" (§98).”

HHJ Dunne dismissed C's argument on Ground 1, first, by reference to the principle that individualised assessments are not needed in every closure case and by dismissing the analogy of Worcestershire.

The judge regarded that case as not being analogous as it involved moving four users to sites which had already been identified, rather than a large-scale reorganisation involving seven sites, as the current decision was, in his view.

Eleanor Grey KC said: “It seems to me that consideration of the other cases cited underlines that they are all fact-sensitive. The decision in Worcestershire did involve a narrower issue (4 service users to identified alternatives; see §86, §92 of that decision). This underscores that the essential question is whether it is arguable that in this case the evidence discloses that there was insufficient information for decision makers to rationally conclude that Seeleys or the 'other options' could meet the needs of the Burnham service users.

“I accept that the papers showing decision-making reveal that D's scrutiny was 'high-level' – nothing in the material referred to by Mr Oldham [for the council] and summarised above amounts to a granular assessment of individuals' needs. However, despite this I accept the submission that there is no realistic prospect of establishing that the analysis made by D, and information held, was insufficient and/or that the conclusions reached on the ability to meet needs were irrational.

“I reach this conclusion because:

a. There was a commitment to maintaining or supporting a range of future provision, potentially including external providers as well as the Council's retained centres.

b. For Burnham users specifically, it was not the case that there was direct reliance on Seeleys only, as the alternative to Burnham – further options or choices were regarded as potentially available to its users and there were no fixed decisions on alternative placements.

c. Some 43 service users are affected from all centres to be closed - C's case about the need for individualised assessment applies logically to all, in all probability, and (even that is wrong) it certainly applies to all the Burnham users (15 in total). Whether or not the overall scale of the reorganisation changes proposed can be called "large-scale" (HHJ Dunne) or not, what can reasonably be expected from D should take this context into account.

d. The assessment that existing needs could be met was based on experience of running D's day centres, coupled with (i) the commitment to invest in upgrading facilities; (ii) modelling of staffing changes that was intended to retain expertise (and assistance from C's own Personal Assistant, which should continue to be available, being unaffected by these changes); (iii) modelling of transport times to the retained day centres (times to centres being an important issue and one potentially creating risk); (iv) carrying out updated assessments of need, as part of the process of arranging new provision; and (v) a commitment to manage all transitions carefully to minimise any disruption and concern – I note the real risks and dangers posed by change, and this was obviously essential.”

Turning to ground 2 - Failure to consult on the option of moving to Seeleys – Eleanor Grey KC said: “C says that the decision to close Burnham was also unlawful as the proposals ultimately adopted were never consulted on (i.e. Seeleys was retained instead of being closed). The law is clear that, where a proposal changes, it may be necessary to undertake a further consultation. The touchstone is one of 'fairness'. This is a legal standard to be determined by the court. A re-consultation is required where there is a 'fundamental difference' between the proposals consulted on and those which the consulting party subsequently wishes to adopt (R (Smith) v East Kent Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 2640 (Admin) at [45]). 

“[…] I note that in the response to the consultation, survey participants expressed the view that 'Existing day centres are unsuitable for most adults who currently attend centres proposed for closure'. There were varying opinions set out, with support expressed by some for Seeleys, as well as suggestions that Burnham should be retained, with Seeleys closed but a small respite unit added at Burnham. So there was an awareness that alternatives to the preferred options might be put forward, and some did so. That seems to me to support the reasoning of HHJ Dunne: that is, the terms of the consultation were open enough to enable respondents to endorse the option of closing Seeleys, but argue in favour of keeping Burnham open – together with any comments on the merits of Burnham, compared to other units.

“In addition:

a. This Ground is also directly based on the submission that Seeleys was identified as the substitute for Burnham – this is why the option to comment on that alternative was required for the consultation to be fair, it is said. However, I have already noted that although D [the council] took the view that all Burnham services users "can" go to Seeleys, still it was always envisaged that the alternatives were wider;

b. I agree with the further reason expressed by HHJ Dunne, that it is difficult to see how the loss of Burnham but not Seeleys makes the position for C worse (§28(b)).  D's response that the retention of Seeleys is "at its very lowest, another option to be at least considered for C and others, albeit that he may not wish or chose to attend there" (Summary Defence, §56) is accepted.”

Dismissing the renewed application, Eleanor Grey KC concluded: “I have borne in mind throughout the test of whether it is arguable that either of the grounds raised on renewal has a realistic prospect of success – the fact that both the decision on the papers and this contested renewal application have involved detailed consideration of the underlying material does not alter this. However, ultimately for the reasons explained above, I take the view that this hurdle has not been overcome.”

Finally, turning to the issue of delay, she said: “Had I accepted the grounds reargued by Mr Mant, I would have been reluctant to dismiss this application on grounds of delay. I should also record that I have not taken into account the fact that C is apparently looking at Chesham as his future venue for day care, as a reason to regard this application as academic. It is obvious that this choice is made in the context of the fact that Burnham is to close, on present plans, and C's opposition to that decision lies at the heart of the application.

“However, for the reasons set out in relation to Grounds 1 and 2 above, I dismiss the renewed application.”

Lottie Winson