Claimant wins legal challenge over support after council decided to accommodate her under section 17 Children Act 1989 rather than section 20

In R (FZW) v Bristol City Council [2026] EWHC 1956 (Admin), Judge Barry Clarke, sitting as a High Court judge, concluded that the council should have found in law that the claimant appeared to them to require accommodation under section 20, reminding local authorities they cannot “side-step” obligations under section 20 by describing accommodation as having been provided under section 17.

The case concerned two young Eritrean women who arrived lawfully in the UK, one a child and one barely an adult, to join their older brother.

After the breakdown of those arrangements, the sisters became homeless.

Although Bristol City Council accommodated and supported the younger sister from July 2024 until her 18th birthday, it treated that support as having been provided under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 rather than section 20.

The consequence was that, when she turned 18, the council denied that she was entitled to care-leaver support under section 23C.  

Two grounds were submitted on behalf of the claimant:

1. The defendant unlawfully “mislabelled” the support and accommodation it provided to the claimant. The claimant said that, in substance if not in form, that support was based on section 20 rather than section 17.
2. The defendant failed to exercise its discretion to treat the claimant as a former relevant child. The defendant treated it as axiomatic that the sisters should be accommodated together, thereby rejecting the section 20 pathway from the outset and doing so without any attempt to gauge the claimant’s wishes and feelings.

Considering the claim, the judge held that the council had unlawfully characterised the support it provided.

He said: “In my judgment, the defendant should have found in law that the claimant appeared to them to require accommodation under section 20. The duty arose on or around 19 July 2024. The defendant discharged that duty in substance if not in form, with the consequence that the claimant was a looked-after child for the purposes of section 22 and 22A-C and was (and remains) a former relevant child – that is, a care leaver – for the purposes of section 23C. She is entitled to the benefits that flow from that status.

“[…] For completeness, I will say that, if I had not upheld ground one, I would alternatively have upheld ground two. This is on the basis that the defendant’s approach was tainted by what can be called ‘process irrationality’. It was irrational because of its failure, before making its decisions, to comply with its statutory duty to ascertain the claimant’s wishes and feelings as set out in section 17(4A) and/or section 20(6).”

He added: “I accept that, if the claimant had been asked for her wishes and feelings, and presented with an informed choice between section 17 and section 20, she would have chosen the section 20 pathway. The defendant’s irrationality in failing to consult her has been profoundly unfair to her; it has deprived her of the significant support that a good parent would have provided upon the transition to adulthood. It continues to have that impact on her, bearing in mind the pre-existing vulnerability that is apparent from almost every page of the defendant’s records. The defendant’s official had observed that the claimant needed support beyond 18 and she did not want this simply to fall away.”

The claimant was represented by Gráinne Mellon and Georgie Rea of Garden Court Chambers, instructed by Deighton Pierce Glynn.  

Commenting on the case, Mellon and Rea said: “The judgment is particularly significant for children in need, migrant children and those with no recourse to public funds. The Court emphasised the primacy of section 20 over section 17 where the statutory criteria are met, and reaffirmed that local authorities do not have a discretion to choose between the two regimes. The fact that a child is accommodated with a sibling or other family member does not, without more, prevent section 20 from applying.

“The decision is also an important reminder of the centrality of the child’s own wishes and feelings. The Judge held that Bristol City Council had never properly consulted the claimant about whether she would prefer a section 20 pathway, with the care-leaver support that would follow, even if that created different accommodation arrangements. The Court accepted her evidence that, had the options been properly explained, she would have chosen the section 20 route because of the educational, financial and practical support available to care leavers.”

The judge did note that the council’s officials were “doing their conscientious best for the sisters. They faced a situation they themselves described as complex, unusual and difficult, and they acted in good faith in seeking a way through. In so doing, as Ms Mellon put it, they treated it as axiomatic that the sisters should remain together. That approach, no doubt motivated by kindness and empathy, did not accord with what the statute required of them”.

Lottie Winson