Court of Appeal grants mother leave to oppose making of adoption order
- Details
The Court of Appeal has granted a mother leave to oppose the making of an adoption order, finding there was “clear reason to believe” that it would be of benefit to the child in the long term.
In G (A Child: Leave To Oppose Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 1445 (11 November 2026), Lord Justice Peter Jackson, with whom Lord Justice Newey and Lady Justice May agreed, concluded that had the Family Court judge acknowledged the solidity of the mother's case, “he would next have asked himself why she should be refused leave”.
The appeal was brought by the mother of D, from the refusal of her application for leave to oppose the making of an adoption order.
In April 2024, when D was around 21 months old, care proceedings began and she was placed in foster care.
A final hearing of the local authority's application took place before HHJ Levey over three days in March 2025.
The mother was represented and gave evidence. D's father played no active part.
Agreed threshold findings documented the mother's drinking and drug use and referred to a series of assaults of one kind or another on her by three partners (one being D's father) in the previous two years.
In a reserved judgment handed down in March 2025, the Family Court judge described the mother as a vulnerable young woman, who had had a terrible childhood involving serious sexual abuse together with physical and emotional abuse at the hands of others.
He observed that it was not surprising that she had encountered difficulties with her mental health in adulthood and had resorted to the use of drugs and alcohol.
The judge had no doubt of the mother’s commitment to the rehabilitation process for D's sake as well as for her own.
He accepted that there was a clear, strong bond between D and her mother, with contact being good.
However, he concluded that the concerns underpinning threshold had not been sufficiently addressed and could not be resolved within D's timescales.
He therefore refused the mother's application for a residential assessment and, being satisfied that adoption was the only realistic option capable of meeting D's long-term welfare needs, he made a care order and a placement order.
Contact last took place in September 2025. D was placed with a prospective adopter in October 2025, and in January 2026, an adoption application was issued.
Lord Justice Peter Jackson said: “The mother herself is now aged 24. She has a new partner and in May 2026 their son R was born. He is the subject of a Child Protection Plan, but no proceedings have been taken in respect of him.”
The mother sought permission to oppose the making of an adoption order, supported by an initial statement.
In the mother's statement in July 2026, she offered these matters as evidence of a change of circumstances since March 2025:
- Abstinence from drugs and alcohol since August 2025, supported by regular testing and engagement with rehabilitation and recovery services
- Remaining abstinent despite the death of both of her parents
- Completion of psychotherapy
- Obtaining stable accommodation
- Ending her abusive relationship and obtaining a restraining order against her former partner, who was serving a prison sentence for assaulting her
- Entering a new relationship in August 2025, which she described as stable and supportive, with backing from R's father's family
- Living with her new partner since March 2026
- Caring for R without the need for proceedings
In a statement by D's social worker, the local authority accepted that there had been a change in the mother's circumstances, describing her abstinence as a significant achievement and a substantial change, given the previous concerns.
It also accepted that her current relationship was stable, and of a very different character to previous relationships. However, there remained uncertainty about the long-term stability of those changes and it was the local authority's view that they were not of a degree sufficient to re-open consideration of the issue of D's adoption.
Having received written and oral submissions from counsel in August 2026, the Family Court judge reserved his decision. He subsequently handed down a 19-page judgment.
The judge made the following conclusions: “Standing back and considering all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the mother's prospects of successfully resisting the adoption application are sufficiently strong to justify the grant of leave. The changes that have occurred are positive, but they remain relatively recent and insufficiently tested. There remains uncertainty as to whether those changes have become embedded and whether they would endure if the demands of caring for D were added to the household. The risk of destabilisation is one which cannot properly be ignored.
"[…] Even if the mother's progress continues, further time would be required before the court could safely conclude that abstinence, recovery and relationship stability had become embedded. D cannot wait for that assessment to be carried out. Her welfare requires decisions to be taken by reference to her timescale, not that of the adults.”
He added: "Having considered all the circumstances of the case, and giving paramount consideration to D's lifelong welfare, I conclude that this is not a case in which leave to oppose the making of the adoption order should be granted. The mother's application is therefore refused."
The adoption hearing was listed for late September 2026.
The week before, the mother sought permission to appeal on the following grounds:
- The Family Court judge was wrong to determine that her prospects of opposing an adoption order were not 'sufficiently strong' by failing to properly weigh her changed circumstances.
- The judge placed improper weight on gaps in the evidence to determine the merits of the mother's application at a permission stage.
- The judge was wrong to say that it was not in D's welfare interest to grant the mother permission to oppose the adoption order.
Counsel for the mother submitted that the evidence provided by the mother gave her prospects of successfully opposing the adoption order that were “more than fanciful”. The court was required to re-examine the necessity of adoption at the final hearing and there was now evidence that adoption was not the only available option. The mother should therefore have been given permission to defend the making of an adoption order.
Outlining the relevant legal framework, Peter Jackson LJ said: “Section 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 provides that where a child has been placed with prospective adopters under a placement order a parent or guardian may not oppose the making of an adoption order without the court's leave.
“Section 47(7) states that the court cannot give leave unless it is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances since the placement order was made.”
Analysing the case, he said: “In my view, this was a clear case for the grant of leave to oppose the making of an adoption order. If leave is not to be granted to this parent, it is difficult to see how s.47(5) offers the meaningful remedy that Parliament intended.”
He noted that at the first stage, the changes in the mother's circumstances were assessed by the judge to be genuine and substantial, and he rightly carried them forward into the welfare assessment.
Peter Jackson LJ continued: “At the welfare stage, some distinctions should be observed.
“First, as a general point, s.47(5) requires a broad and practical balancing exercise, as befits a threshold provision. An overly-detailed assessment risks drawing the court into a trial of the adoption application on incomplete evidence, something deprecated in Re W at §42.
“Second, it is important to remember that the question to be answered is whether or not it is in the child's interests for there to be an opposed adoption hearing (Re M at §21). It is not whether it is in the child's interests to be adopted. Put another way, the decision is not a decision about adoption but a decision about the management of an adoption application.
“Third, as part of the welfare evaluation, the court looks to see whether the parent has a solid case, a substantial case that deserves consideration. They do not have to show that they are more likely than not to succeed. To borrow from a different context (Re H (A Child) [2015] EWCA Civ 1284, [2016] 2 F.L.R. 1173, at §70), the court is asking whether a case is a 'runner', not whether it is a 'winner'.”
He continued: “In this case, the Judge acknowledged that the decision was one of some difficulty and he paid deep attention to it, including by reserving judgment and giving extensive reasons. Indeed, the very degree of care that he took gives some indication that the mother had put forward a solid case for the court's consideration. As it was, his conclusion at [70] amounted to a judgement that her case would not succeed, when the question at that stage of the analysis was different and less demanding. This inadvertently set a test that was stringent and close to being unachievable.
“Had the Judge acknowledged the solidity of the mother's case, he would next have asked himself why she should be refused leave: Re B-S at §74(iii). That would have led him to consider the narrower question of the short-term impact of a contested hearing alongside other welfare considerations.”
Another aspect of the appeal concerned the Family Court judge's appreciation that the evidence was incomplete.
On this point, Peter Jackson LJ said: “There are clearly some questions that only time can answer. Others may be answered or clarified by the filing of further evidence, including professional or even expert evidence. In this case, the Judge rightly identified gaps in relation to the partner and about the form of any rehabilitation plan. Those were matters that could only be clarified by professional assessment and input. The mother had already produced a significant amount of evidence and it is difficult to see why those particular gaps counted against her application.”
Peter Jackson LJ allowed the appeal, granted the mother leave to oppose the making of an adoption order, and remitted the proceedings for an early case management hearing before a judge nominated by the Family Presiding Judge.
He added: “In doing so, I express no view whatever about the outcome of the adoption application, which will now be determined by the Family Court on the basis of all the evidence.”
Lord Justice Newey and Lady Justice May agreed.
Lottie Winson
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