High Court allows council appeal against quashing of noise abatement notice, despite “unnecessary wording” in notice

Enfield Council has successfully appealed against a district judge's decision to quash a noise abatement notice issued pursuant to section 80(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 over the "production of noisy music".

Mr Justice Dexter Dias described some of the wording in the council's notice as "unnecessary" but concluded the notice's requirements were not unnecessary or unreasonable.

The London borough served the respondent with an abatement notice in April 2022 for playing loud music from his home.

The notice called on the homeowner to "exercise proper control of the volume" of sound coming from his home, which is an end-terrace property on a residential street.

The notice read:

"The production of noisy music

HEREBY REQUIRE YOU as the owner of the premises […] from which the noise is or would be emitted [forthwith] from the service of this notice to abate the same and also hereby prohibit the recurrence of the same and for that purpose require you to:

"Exercise proper control of the volume of sound generated at the premises to ensure that the total volume of sound emitted is not likely to cause a nuisance to persons residing in the vicinity."

The respondent appealed the notice, pursuant to section 80(3) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and Regulations 2(2)(a) and (c) of the Statutory Nuisance (Appeals) Regulations.

The relevant regulations read:

2(2)(a): "that the abatement notice is not justified by s.80 of the EPA."

2(2)(c): "that the authority has refused unreasonably to accept compliance with alternative requirements, or that the requirements of the abatement notice are otherwise unreasonable in character or extent, or are unnecessary".

At Highbury Corner Magistrates' Court, District Judge Julia Newton found that, while the issuing of the notice was justified pursuant to section 80 of the 1990 Act, "as a result of an omission in the Notice to specify the steps to be taken, as may be necessary for the purpose of abating the nuisance and prohibiting the recurrence of the same, the Notice was invalid".

Her decision added: "If that was incorrect, then it was held that the requirements of the notice were unreasonable in character or extent. The wording was unfair and unreasonable. Consequently, the notice was quashed."

The council then appealed the decision to the High Court, arguing that the district judge was wrong by determining that the notice specified steps and then did not specify the requirements with sufficient clarity. 

A summary of its submission in the High Court judgment read: "The Notice was not invalid on either that basis or due to the second part of the Notice, which in any event could be deleted or varied under the Regulations without affecting the Notice's validity."

The council also said there should be no order as to costs, as the local authority was "simply doing its statutory duty to issue a notice following a finding of nuisance".

The respondent meanwhile submitted that the notice specified steps by the inclusion in the notice of the word "and". However, the authority was not or not sufficiently clear about what steps were required, rendering the notice invalid, the respondent argued.

They further submitted that the term "likely to cause nuisance" was an unreasonable and unenforceable requirement in practice and in itself rendered the notice invalid. This compounded the unreasonableness of the failure to specify steps in either half of the notice, the submission added.

Mr Justice Dias ultimately found that the district judge was incorrect to find that the wording of the abatement notice required the notice to specify steps to be taken in order to abate the noise nuisance.

He also found that the district judge was incorrect in finding the notice invalid.

In addition, the judge concluded that the district judge was wrong to have found the wording was "unreasonable in character or extent".

On this point, Dias J said that while some words in the notice were "unnecessary", the requirements were not unnecessary or unreasonable.

Finally, Dias J concluded that the district judge was wrong to have ordered the council to pay half of the respondent's costs as the notice was valid and the appeal should have been dismissed.

The judge's decision was quashed, and the case was remitted to the Highbury Corner Magistrates' Court with a direction to dismiss both the appeal and the costs order.

The council told the court a separate costs application was "imminent". 

Adam Carey