Correcting mistakes in public decision making

Does the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’) have a power, incidental to her express powers in the Immigration Act 1971 (“IA 1971”), to withdraw a decision notified to an individual by administrative error in order to replace it with the correct decision that the SSHD had always intended to communicate?

In YC v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 285, the Court of Appeal has held, by a majority, that the SSHD does have such a power.

The facts were as follows. YC claimed asylum. The SSHD refused YC’s protection claim, but decided to grant to him limited leave to remain (“LLTR”) on private life grounds. However, an error was made when notifying this grant to YC. The decision maker inadvertently selected the wrong letter template and, as a result, YC was sent a letter notifying him that he had been granted settlement. This had not been intended. YC had not applied for settlement, and fell considerably short of meeting the requirements for a grant of settlement under the Immigration Rules. The SSHD had intended to grant him LLTR.

Shortly afterwards, YC was sent a biometric residence permit (“BRP”) stating that he had been granted LLTR. His solicitors emailed the SSHD noting the inconsistency between the BRP and the grant letter. The SSHD responded, attaching a corrected letter dated which recorded that YC had been granted LLTR private life grounds. The correction was made on 22 December. The original letter had been sent on 13 November.

YC judicially reviewed the SSHD’s decision of 22 December to replace the original letter, granting settlement, i.e. indefinite leave to remain (“ILR”), with the correct letter, granting LLTR. He argued (i) although the decision had been mistaken, there had been an effective grant of ILR on 13 November (relying on a line of case law beginning with R v SSHD, ex parte Ram [1979] 1 WLR 148); and (ii) once ILR had been granted, it could not be revoked unless the limited circumstances provided for in section 76 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“NIAA 2002”) applied. By the time of the hearing, the SSHD did not dispute the first proposition, but argued that she did have the power to withdraw and replace a decision notified in error. That power was incidental to the express powers conferred on the SSHD under sections 3 and 4 of the IA 1971.

On YC’s appeal from the Upper Tribunal’s decision dismissing his claim, the Court of Appeal held, by a majority (Cobb LJ and Dingemans LJ, Senior President of Tribunals, with Elisabeth Laing LJ dissenting), that the SSHD has an incidental power, under the IA 1971, to correct mistakes of the nature of clerical errors, such as that made in YC’s case. The majority emphasised that the exercise of the power is subject to public law constraints and it can be exercised only where the mistake is obvious, and its correction undertaken promptly. Cobb LJ observed that, in the present case, it was clear that YC could not reasonably have expected to receive a grant of ILR, a status for which he had neither applied nor satisfied the requirements of the Immigration Rules (and grants of ILR outside the Rules are exceptionally rare). In that regard, the mistake was obvious; the correction was made straightaway.

This is a significant decision on both the scope of the SSHD’s incidental powers under the IA 1971 and, more generally, the power of public authorities to correct mistakes in decision making. The Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal observed that none of the authorities cited, whether in the immigration context or the wider public law context (such as Porteous v West Dorset DC [2004] EWCA Civ 244, concerning a local housing authority’s power to reconsider a final decision where there had been a fundamental mistake of fact) addressed the precise issue arising in YC, which was novel.

The SSHD was represented in the Court of Appeal by Landmark Chambers’ David Blundell KC and Hafsah Masood (who was sole counsel in the Upper Tribunal).