High Court allows litigants in person to recover cost of AI legal research tool in housing dispute
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The High Court has allowed two litigants in person to recover the £1,488 cost of an artificial intelligence legal research subscription as a disbursement, finding that the subscription was not a payment for "legal services" under the Civil Procedure Rules but was reasonably and proportionately incurred for the conduct of the litigation.
The judgment in Foster & Hitchens v Wargrave on Thames Housing Association Ltd [2026] EWHC 3000 (KB) - handed down on 19 November 2026 - follows a successful appeal by Linda Foster and Richard Hitchens against a possession order obtained by the housing association over their flat, which turned on the construction of an electricity charge in their tenancy agreement.
The appellants claimed twelve monthly payments of £124 for a subscription to an AI legal research tool. They could not fund it themselves and borrowed the money from Mr Hitchens's brother.
They told the court the tool was used to identify authorities, conduct legal research and assist in preparing submissions, and acknowledged there was no direct authority on whether a litigant in person could recover such a cost.
CPR 46.5(3) allows a litigant in person to recover costs for the same categories of work and disbursements that would have been allowed had a legal representative acted, under sub-paragraph (a), and "payments reasonably made by the litigant in person for legal services relating to the conduct of the proceedings", under sub-paragraph (b).
The appellants relied on sub-paragraph (b) and argued in the alternative that the cost was a separate disbursement.
Mr Justice Sweeting rejected the first argument. He said a legal service ordinarily involves legal advice, representation or assistance provided by another person or organisation, whereas the subscription gave the appellants access to a software platform which they used for their own research and preparation.
The judge compared it to a legal database subscription, a practitioner text or legal software, which he described as "tools used in the performance of legal work".
He said the use of artificial intelligence did not alter the essential character of the software. The subscription did not involve advice from a qualified lawyer and did not transfer responsibility for the legal content of the submissions to the provider. Citing United Building and Plumbing Contractors v Kajla [2002] EWCA Civ 628 and Francois v Waltham Forest LBC [2024] EWHC 1162 (KB), he said "legal services" in r.46.5(3)(b) refers to services provided by or under the supervision of a lawyer.
The housing association argued that the expenditure was an overhead and that allowing it would be an unwarranted extension of the categories of recoverable litigation expense with wider implications for cases involving litigants in person.
Sweeting J said the introduction of artificial intelligence did not require the court to formulate any special rule. The question was whether, applying established principles, the cost should properly be characterised as a disbursement and whether it was reasonably and proportionately incurred.
He said the same approach had been taken to electronic disclosure platforms, document management systems and litigation support services.
"The technology itself neither renders the expenditure automatically recoverable nor automatically irrecoverable," the judge said.
He drew a distinction between expenditure forming part of a party's general infrastructure and expenditure on a specific litigation support service obtained for particular proceedings, which he said was a recognised category.
The judge said it would be "an odd outcome" if legal professionals could deploy their standing AI resources in litigation while litigants in person were in effect precluded from using similar tools.
Sweeting J said he emphasised the word "responsible" in referring to the responsible use of artificial intelligence. The use of AI to generate prolix and unhelpful material was likely to lead to costs being disallowed even where they might otherwise be recoverable in principle.
On the facts, he noted that the appellants are pensioners in their 70s living in social housing who told the court they could not obtain legal aid or afford legal advice.
They did not use a general or free large language model but bought a subscription from a well-known supplier giving access to a sector-specific AI agent, he said.
Their submissions were "careful, reasonably focused and ultimately successful on the principal issue". The subscription was not maintained for other purposes.
Mr Justice Sweeting allowed the item in full but said he was not holding that the cost of AI-assisted support is automatically recoverable.
"The technology may be new, but the principles governing recoverability are not," he said.
Elsewhere in the judgment, Sweeting J assessed costs on the standard basis and reduced the appellants' claim for 649 hours of their own time at the litigant in person rates to £5,600, about 40% of the sum claimed.
He declined to order repayment of electricity charges already paid and declined to make an order under section 20C of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985.




