Public interest and legal professional privilege under the Freedom of Information Act 2000
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The Information Tribunal recently dismissed a Cabinet Office appeal concerning the disclosure of Covid-19 legal advice. James Maurici KC and Siân McGibbon explain why.
The First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) dismissed an appeal by the Cabinet Office against a decision of the Information Commissioner requiring disclosure of legal advice given to Government in March 2020 concerning social distancing measures and the mandatory closure of social venues during the Covid-19 pandemic: Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Ben Kingsley [2026] UKFTT 763 (GRC).
The case arose from a Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) request for legal advice given in the early days of the Covid-19 pandemic, concerning the legislative basis for the first national restrictions. The material comprised advice provided by Department of Health and Social Care lawyers on 15 March 2020 and by Cabinet Office lawyers on 20 March 2020. The Cabinet Office withheld the advice under section 42(1) FOIA, which exempts information protected by legal professional privilege. The Information Commissioner concluded that legal professional privilege had not been waived, but that the public interest nevertheless favoured disclosure.
The Cabinet Office appealed. The Tribunal was required to determine two issues: first, whether privilege had been waived by evidence given by the (then) Michal Gove MP to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry; and secondly, if privilege remained intact, where the public interest balance under section 2(2)(b) FOIA lay.
Waiver of privilege
The Tribunal held that legal professional privilege is capable, as a matter of law, of being waived by evidence given to a public inquiry (§§48-49). The fact that an inquiry is inquisitorial rather than adversarial is relevant context, but is not determinative of whether waiver has occurred (§§50-52).
On the facts, however, Gove’s evidence to the Covid-19 Inquiry had not waived privilege. Having considered the legal advice itself, the Tribunal found that Gove was not referring to either of the two pieces of advice at issue, and even if he had been, his evidence did not disclose their substance or gist (§59). Section 42(1) was therefore engaged.
The public interest balance
The Tribunal nevertheless upheld the Commissioner’s conclusion that the public interest favoured disclosure. It emphasised that, although there is significant inherent public interest in maintaining legal professional privilege, section 42 is a qualified rather than absolute exemption (§§68-70). The Tribunal rejected the Cabinet Office’s submission that the applicable test was effectively one of “exceptionality”, holding that the balance remained an intensely fact-sensitive assessment in each case (§71).
The Tribunal attached little weight to the fact that the advice was comparatively recent and potentially remained “live” (§§73-77). Much of the emergency Covid legislation and restrictions had ceased to have effect by the date of the FOIA response, significant subsequent learning had taken place, and disclosure would not prevent Government from drawing on the advice in a future emergency. It also attached no material weight to the Cabinet Office’s “chilling effect” argument (§84). Although the Tribunal accepted evidence about the particular pressures under which government lawyers operate during emergencies, it was not persuaded that disclosure of this advice would be likely to cause lawyers in future emergencies to adopt a slower, more cautious “peacetime” approach (§§88-92). It recognised that officials should have a safe space to formulate and explore advice with complete candour, but accepted the argument of the Respondents that in judging the effect of disclosure on future conduct of officials it could be expected that they would act with courage, independence, and an understanding of the importance of their impartial role (§§93-95).
Of particular importance was the strong public interest in transparency surrounding the Government’s decision-making at the outset of the pandemic. The advice formed part of the material relevant to decisions about the legislative route used to impose unprecedented restrictions on the population. The Tribunal considered that disclosure would enable the public better to understand the legal information which informed those decisions, how complete that information was, and whether it was followed or rejected; this was therefore one of the rare cases in which the public interest in disclosure outweighed the significant public interest inherent in maintaining legal professional privilege.
James Maurici KC and Siân McGibbon of Landmark Chambers acted for the Second Respondent.
Civil Litigation Lawyer
Corporate Director of Legal and Regulatory Services
Generalist Lawyer
23-11-2026
08-12-2026 10:00 am


