Judge blasts lack of therapy for mother faced with losing second child

A Family Court judge has questioned the spending of money on the issuing of legal proceedings and on psychological evidence when this expenditure is incurred before attempts have been made at therapeutic support, in a case where a vulnerable mother was faced with the loss of a second child to adoption.

His Honour Judge Wildblood’s comments were made in A Local Authority v The Mother & Anor [2017] EWFC B59, which he described as “a desperately sad case” where, for the second time in six months, the mother faced the loss to adoption of a child that she loved deeply.

The judge said: “Her grief is very apparent. This is yet another truly wretched public law case. It is also yet another case of a young mother with a background in which she has experienced extreme abuse and deprivation whom, I am told by everyone involved in this case, has not been offered therapeutic support. It may well have been discussed with her in the past but has never been followed through to the point of offer of therapy.

“I have seen a lot of wringing of hands as people speak with regret about the sadness of this case. I express that sadness and regret myself. Once again I have heard psychological evidence, obtained at considerable expense and so easily expressed, that any progress that the mother might now make is 'outwith the timescales of the child'. But I ask anyone who does read through this judgment to ask themselves these four questions:

i) Is it right that this mother should not yet have been offered therapy, particularly bearing in mind that her first child was born three years ago and was himself the subject of lengthy proceedings?

ii) If she had been offered therapy at an early stage, is there not at least a possibility that the outcome of these proceedings might have been different?

iii) Even if the outcome would not have been different, would not an attempt at therapy make these proceedings more satisfactory?

iv) Has the money that has been spent on issuing proceedings (£2,055 is the cost of issuing a care application) and on psychological evidence (over £2,000) well spent when the expenditure is incurred before attempts at therapeutic support have been made in cases of this nature.” [Judge’s emphases]

In the case an unnamed local authority sought, with the support of the guardian, care and placement orders in relation to a five-month-old girl living with short-term foster carers under an interim care order. She was living with her three-year-old brother who was made subject to care and placement orders in May 2017.

The local authority intended that the siblings should move together to prospective adopters with the mother having only ‘letterbox’ contact.

The mother, who is in her mid-20s and lives with members of her family, opposed the making of the orders. She had been assessed as having a full -cale IQ of 66 but did have litigation capacity.

The judge said the evidence led in an overwhelming way to a “wretched conclusion”, namely that he felt “constrained to state that care and placement orders are necessary, proportionate and legal” in the terms that he had explained.

HHJ Wildblood found that only a placement order, with an underlying care order, would satisfy G's paramount interests and that he must dispense with the mother's consent to G being placed for adoption on the ground stated in section 52(1)(b) of the Act. He therefore made care and placement orders.

The judge went on to cite his comments in an earlier case, which he heard when he first became designated family judge, on the importance of therapy, when it is needed, being obtained at an early stage.

In that ruling he said: “Time and time again I see a process whereby the following occurs: a) a Local Authority intervenes and begins making assessment of a family; b) months later proceedings are issued; c) an order is made for some form of expert evidence to be produced (often a psychological report); d) months later the psychological report is obtained which says, invariably and utterly foreseeably, that someone within the family needs therapy and e) it is stated that, by then, the beneficial effect of therapy would be 'outwith the timescales for the child'.

“In this case, for instance, it would have been perfectly obvious to all that, when the mother was referred before birth, she was a prime candidate for therapy. If therapy were to be obtained at an early stage such as that there is at least a prospect that outcomes in some cases might be different. I have therefore already set up arrangements in the New Year to look very carefully at how we facilitate and access therapy in this area, with a view to doing my utmost to encourage much earlier therapeutic intervention if possible. I ask for as much help as possible with that endeavour'.”

In this latest case he revealed that despite very many meetings on the issue and the “truly phenomenal efforts” of a psychologist involved, very little progress had been made beyond the start of the Pause Programme.

“I remain hopeful that we will find a breakthrough on this point one day but at the moment it eludes me and [the psychologist]. Once again, I would ask for as much help as possible with it,” he added.

“I am told that the mother will be recommended to the Pause programme here. I very much hope that they will take her into that programme and that she will benefit from it. She deserves a break.”