Cyber Security and Resilience Bill: Why Local Authorities Cannot Afford to Wait

The UK Government’s proposed Cyber Security and Resilience Bill (“CSRB”) is expected to become law later this year and represents the most significant overhaul of the UK’s cyber security framework since the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018.

For local authorities in England and Wales, the Bill is likely to mark a significant shift in regulatory expectations. Cyber security is rapidly moving beyond the IT function and into the core of governance, operational resilience and public service delivery.

Local authorities are increasingly dependent on complex digital infrastructure and outsourced technology providers to deliver essential public services. At the same time, cyber attacks against public bodies are becoming more frequent, more sophisticated and more disruptive.

The consequence is that Chief Executives, Monitoring Officers, senior leadership teams and governance professionals are now expected not only to understand cyber risk, but to demonstrate that it is being actively managed.

The Bill forms part of the Government’s wider response to the increasing threat posed by ransomware, cyber attacks and weaknesses within critical public sector supply chains. Its purpose is to strengthen the resilience of organisations delivering essential services and increase accountability for cyber risk across both public bodies and their suppliers.

For local authorities, this is not just another IT issue. The Bill will increase expectations around cyber governance, supplier oversight, incident reporting and organisational accountability — at a time when authorities are already managing significant financial pressure, service demand and operational challenges.

The direction of travel is clear: cyber resilience is now a leadership and governance issue, not simply a technical one.

Why This Matters for Local Authorities

Local authorities rely heavily on interconnected digital systems and outsourced suppliers to deliver critical services, including:

• adult social care;
• children’s services and safeguarding;
• housing and homelessness services;
• revenues and benefits;
• planning and environmental services;
• education support;
• procurement and finance systems; and
• democratic and corporate governance functions.

Authorities also hold substantial volumes of sensitive personal and operational data, including safeguarding information, financial data and information relating to vulnerable individuals.

At the same time, many local authorities are increasingly dependent on third-party suppliers, cloud platforms, managed service providers and shared service arrangements.

The Government is particularly concerned about the cyber risks created by these interconnected supply chains and the growing impact of ransomware attacks on essential public services.

The practical consequences of a serious cyber incident for a local authority can include:

• prolonged service disruption;
• inability to access critical records or systems;
• safeguarding risks;
• housing and homelessness disruption;
• payroll or financial processing failures;
• data protection breaches;
• regulatory scrutiny;
• emergency recovery costs;
• reputational damage; and
• loss of public confidence.

The financial and legal consequences can also be significant. Depending on the nature of the incident, organisations may face:

• regulatory investigation and enforcement action;
• significant business interruption and recovery costs;
• contractual disputes with suppliers or contractors;
• increased insurance costs and coverage disputes;
• potential UK GDPR penalties and compensation claims; and
• serious reputational damage with members, residents, regulators and central government.

In more serious cases, cyber failures may also expose wider governance weaknesses and lead to scrutiny from auditors, inspectors, regulators or government departments around operational resilience, governance and risk management.

For senior leadership teams, the key issue is increasingly not whether a cyber incident occurs, but whether the authority can demonstrate that it took reasonable and proportionate steps to prepare for it.

Increasingly, cyber incidents are being viewed not simply as IT failures, but as wider governance and operational resilience failures.

What Will Change?

The Bill is expected to introduce:

• tougher cyber security obligations for suppliers and managed service providers;
• enhanced incident reporting requirements;
• greater regulatory powers and enforcement;
• increased scrutiny of supply chain risk; and
• stronger expectations around senior leadership accountability.

Even where a local authority is not directly regulated under the new framework, many of its suppliers almost certainly will be — and those obligations are likely to flow through into contracts, procurement processes and governance expectations.

This is likely to place greater pressure on local authorities to demonstrate robust oversight of:

• outsourced IT arrangements;
• cyber security controls;
• incident response procedures;
• business continuity planning;
• procurement governance; and
• supplier risk management.

What Should Local Authorities Be Doing Now?

Many local authorities are still operating with contractual frameworks, governance structures and supplier arrangements that were not designed for the current cyber threat environment.

That creates real exposure where authorities cannot clearly demonstrate:

• senior oversight of cyber risk;
• effective supplier due diligence;
• legally robust incident response procedures;
• appropriate contractual protections; and
• clear escalation and reporting arrangements.

In practice, one of the biggest issues following a cyber incident is rarely the technology failure alone. More often, the difficulty lies in fragmented decision-making, uncertainty around legal reporting obligations and lack of clarity over organisational accountability.

From a legal and governance perspective, local authorities should now be considering:

• whether existing supplier contracts contain appropriate cyber security, audit, notification and business continuity obligations;
• whether liability and indemnity provisions properly address cyber incidents and data breaches;
• whether procurement processes adequately assess supplier resilience and supply chain risk;
• whether employment policies and disciplinary frameworks sufficiently address cyber security responsibilities, remote working and acceptable use obligations;
• whether internal governance structures clearly allocate responsibility for cyber risk and incident escalation; and
• whether incident response plans properly integrate legal, regulatory, HR, communications and operational decision-making.

Authorities should also consider whether members, audit committees and senior leadership teams are receiving sufficient reporting and assurance around cyber resilience as part of wider governance and risk management arrangements.

The Regulatory Risk Is Increasing

The wider regulatory environment is also shifting.

Cyber incidents can trigger overlapping legal and regulatory obligations, including:

• UK GDPR reporting obligations;
• contractual notification duties;
• insurance requirements;
• safeguarding obligations;
• public law duties; and
• potential scrutiny from regulators, auditors and central government.

Local authorities that are unable to demonstrate credible cyber governance and resilience arrangements may face significant operational, legal and reputational consequences.

The Key Message

The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill represents a major shift in regulatory expectations for organisations delivering essential public services.

For local authorities, the issue is no longer whether cyber risk exists — it is whether organisations can demonstrate that they are managing it appropriately.

Authorities that act early will be better placed to protect services, reassure residents, satisfy regulators and manage operational risk.

Those that do not may find that the consequences of a cyber incident extend far beyond IT disruption and become a broader governance and regulatory issue.

About Jonathan Askin

Jonathan is a commercial partner who has more than 20 years’ experience across all aspects of commercial law and has held senior leadership roles at Top 50 UK law firms.

In private practice, Jonathan has advised a wide range of clients, from PLCs and multinational organisations to owner-managed businesses and start-ups. He has also held senior in-house positions, including time with the UK Government as Senior Legal Counsel (Commercial), advising on complex commercial and procurement matters.

His practice covers commercial agreements, data protection, IP and business relationships, with sector experience spanning hospitality and leisure, technology, media and entertainment, gaming, manufacturing, retail, travel, rail, sport and the public sector. He regularly advises on complex commercial arrangements, including supply chain and outsourcing contracts, data and AI governance, and strategic risk allocation.