Father fails in human rights claim against council over contact and moral views

Cornwall Council did not breach the human rights of a father who claimed the local authority had prevented direct contact with his son due to his moral views.

The case of A v Cornwall Council [2017] EWHC 842 (QB) (28 April 2017) concerned a claim brought by ‘A’ against Cornwall Council under the Human Rights Act 1998 following a Family Court order that there should not be direct contact between A and his son ’S’.

A claimed Cornwall infringed his human rights because it prevented contact with S because of opinions A had expressed in blogs about abortion and same sex marriage.

The council said it made proper safeguarding inquiries and rightly considered blogs produced by A in which he referred to a child aged eight months as “hardly” being a real person, but did not discriminate and made proper recommendations to the Family Court.

Giving judgment, Dingemans J said it was apparent from A’s blogs that he had strong views on abortion and homosexuality, but that it was the reference to “hardly a person” that most concerned the police and social workers.

The judge said: “I accept and find (and by the end of the case it was effectively common ground) that A was using the phrase about an eight month old child ‘hardly’ being a person in his blog in an attempt to parody the argument that a foetus is not a person.

“However it was also apparent from the evidence, and I find, that [social worker] ‘SW’ took the comment literally, and having taken it literally was understandably concerned about it.”

He found there had been no infringement of A's human rights, and “I accept SW was entitled to consider A's blogs and views when making her assessments and reports to the Family Court.

“This is because, when read literally (which was not the way A intended the blogs to be read) the blogs suggested that A did not consider that an eight month old child was a real person.

“SW was also entitled to consider the strength of A's views and question whether A would tolerate any dissent… I am satisfied that SW did not act to stop A having contact with S because A believed that abortion and same sex marriage was wrong, and I have already confirmed that it was common ground that if SW had taken any such approach it would not have been lawful.”

The judge added he was satisfied that if SW had been persuaded after meeting A that contact between A and S was in the best interests of S, SW would have made that recommendation.

Mark Smulian